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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is unique in subjecting corporate income to two layers of 
tax.1 In what is called a “classical system,” corporate income is taxed once at the 
entity level when earned and a second time at the individual level when 
distributed to shareholders in the form of a dividend.2 By contrast, in most other 
countries, corporate- and shareholder-level taxes are fully or partially 
integrated through some form of credit or deduction. America’s double taxation 
of corporate income is a much-criticized but persistent feature of its current tax 
system despite numerous reform proposals over the last half-century or so.3 
Although some measure of integration was finally enacted in 2003 when 
Congress adopted legislation taxing dividends at the lower capital-gains rate, 
this legislation, scheduled to expire in 2010, fell far short of including the 
exemption from individual taxation that was originally proposed.4 Some 
commentators have viewed this modest progress as perhaps the ultimate 
sounding of the death knell for integration efforts, noting that President Bush 
was at the height of his power in early 2003 and he had identified this as one of 
his top priorities.5 
The entrenchment of our current classical system of corporate taxation is 
not a recent phenomenon, nor was it a preordained conclusion from the outset 
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 1. Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income 
Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1768 (1999). 
 2. I.R.C. § 11 (2006) (imposing an income tax on corporations); I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (2006) 
(imposing a tax on shareholders on distributions out of corporate earnings and profits). 
 3. Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 
518–19, 521 (2009). 
 4. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302, 117 Stat. 752 
(codified at I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2006)). Originally scheduled to expire in 2008, the relief was extended to 
2010. Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345, 
346. 
 5. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX xii (2009). 
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of the corporate income tax.6 The turning point in the corporate tax may have 
been the decade following World War II. If there ever was a legislative moment 
for reenvisioning the corporate tax, it was then. Consensus as to the problems 
with corporate taxation was significant. Businesses had borne the brunt of the 
burden during the war.7 Over that four-year period, corporate income tax rates 
had more than doubled from nineteen percent to forty percent and Congress 
had enacted a new excess profits tax at rates topping out at ninety-five percent.8 
Combined, the two levies accounted for almost fifty-six percent of net income 
reported to the government by 1944.9 The high rates served to heighten scrutiny 
of the double taxation of corporate income, which had emerged during the New 
Deal as a byproduct of President Roosevelt’s ill-fated experiment with an 
undistributed-profits tax.10 Additionally, the winding down of the war promised 
to lower revenue needs. As a consequence, the push for major corporate tax 
reform emerged well before V-E Day. By January of 1946, sixty proposals for 
the relief of double taxation were in circulation,11 many of which were 
repackaged or reintroduced during succeeding years. It was not until 1954, 
though, as part of a comprehensive revamp of the Internal Revenue Code, that 
Congress enacted limited, and ultimately short-lived, dividend tax relief.12 
This paper considers three questions: (1) Why was dividend-tax relief so 
long in coming, given the initial momentum for reform; (2) What led dividend-
tax reform to rise to the top of the agenda in 1954; and (3) Why, given the 
degree of interest in integration proposals, was the relief so modest? 
 
 6. Compare Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark, An Evolutionary Perspective on the History of U.S. 
Business Taxation, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 1, 4–5 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) 
(arguing that the history of the corporate income tax has been “contingent and highly punctuated”), 
with Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and 
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 92 (1977) (arguing that the corporate tax system was the outcome of several 
basic decisions at the outset). 
 7. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 115 (2d ed. 
2004). 
 8. For corporate income tax and excess profits tax rates, see JACK TAYLOR, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., CORPORATE INCOME TAX BRACKETS AND RATES, 1909–2002, DATA RELEASE, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf (last visited October 21, 2009) and Tax Policy Ctr., Major 
Enacted Tax Legislation, 1940–1949, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/legislation/1940.cfm (last visited 
October 21, 2009). The excess profits tax, enacted before the U.S. entered the war, used the years 1936 
through 1939 as its base, but allowed corporations to elect an invested capital base of eight percent on 
the first $5 million and six percent on the next $5 million. Alfred G. Buehler, The Problem of the Excess 
Profits Tax, in EXCESS PROFITS TAXATION 3, 7 (Tax Institute, Inc. ed., 1953). 
 9. Buehler, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
 10. See Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 172 (2002). 
 11. Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 30, 1946, at 1. 
 12. I.R.C. §§ 34, 116(a) (1954).  
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II 
POSTWAR CORPORATE TAX REFORM 
A.  A Flurry of Tax Reform Proposals 
In September of 1944, with American troops still fighting in Europe, the 
Treasury Department’s Director of Tax Research, Roy Blough, predicted that 
the task of crafting a postwar tax program would be “the most difficult tax 
problem in American history.”13 Expenses remained at record levels while the 
appetite for fiscal sacrifice was waning. The excess profits tax and the wartime 
hikes in corporate income tax rates were considered serious threats to the 
economy’s postwar recovery. At the same time, the individual tax burden had 
grown dramatically. The fundamental changes wrought by the Revenue Act of 
1942, in particular, had both cut individual exemptions drastically and 
significantly lowered the thresholds for the application of the rising surtax rates 
on both corporate and individual income. Each of these trends served to 
increase the stakes for remedying a wide variety of legislative flaws that had 
been ignored while the war was in high gear. 
Double taxation quickly emerged as one of the primary targets of business 
leaders. This was in large part an outgrowth of the concern for the postwar 
economy. Several influential studies documented the potential negative effects 
a high tax burden on corporate income would have on any postwar recovery.14 
In an address before the National Retail Dry Goods Association, investment 
banker John Hancock advocated reducing corporate rates to their prewar levels 
“to encourage expansion by private enterprise.”15 
One specific concern was the effect of taxes, and particularly double 
taxation, on incentives for stock investment.16 George Barnes, a banker and a 
governor of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms, declared that “[t]he 
present method of taxing corporate earnings and again taxing the same earnings 
when they are distributed to the shareholder as dividends, probably constitutes 
the main stumbling block to a free flow of post-war capital into new industry 
and the expansion of old ones.”17 The Wall Street Journal concurred with this 
assessment, opining, “With the return of peace it will be vital to our economy 
that capital flow into new enterprise to provide employment and to increase the 
 
 13. Ruml Asks Repeal of Corporate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1944, at 20. 
 14. J. KEITH BUTTERS & JOHN LINTNER, EFFECT OF FEDERAL TAXES ON GROWING 
ENTERPRISES, STUDY NO. 1: THE LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 29–30 (1944); J. KEITH 
BUTTERS & JOHN LINTNER, EFFECT OF FEDERAL TAXES ON GROWING ENTERPRISES, STUDY NO. 2: 
POLAROID CORPORATION (1944). See Current Topics of Interest in Wall Street: Taxes and New 
Ventures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1944, at 27; High Tax Held Curb on Small Business, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 1944, at 31. 
 15. Edward A. Morrow, Corporate Tax Cut Urged by Hancock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1944, at 21. 
 16. See RICHARD B. GOODE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE POSTWAR CORPORATION TAX 
STRUCTURE 4–7 (1946). 
 17. George E. Barnes, A Plan to Simplify Corporation Taxes and a Solution of Double Taxation of 
Corporate Earnings, EXCHANGE, Sept. 1944, at 1, 15. 
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national income. It is difficult to see how this can happen so long as the present 
cramping system of double taxation exists.”18 Corporate leaders’ support for a 
campaign against double taxation was therefore due in large part to this 
perceived need for more equity capital. 
True tax reform began in the summer of 1944, when three high-profile tax 
proposals were released within weeks of each other. Despite proposals in 1943 
and 1944 to modify the double tax,19 the tax reform fervor did not begin in 
earnest until the summer of 1944, when three high-profile tax reform proposals 
backed by different business groups were released within weeks of each other. 
Carl Shoup, a Columbia economist and Treasury consultant, called this 
beginning to what would become a fairly sophisticated national debate over the 
direction of tax policy “a significant development in American public finance.”20 
The most radical corporate-integration-reform proposal of the three was in 
a report prepared by Beardsley Ruml, the chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and treasurer of R.H. Macy & Co., and Hans Christian 
Sonne, a banker originally from Denmark, for the Business Committee of the 
National Planning Association.21 Following on the heels of a briefer, but similar, 
proposal offered by Princeton economist Harley Lutz,22 Ruml and Sonne 
advocated repealing the corporate income tax almost completely and replacing 
it with a five-percent franchise tax and a form of undistributed-profits tax.23 
Effectively, it was a return to Roosevelt’s 1936 plan to replace the corporate 
income tax with an undistributed-profits tax. The latter was ostensibly imposed 
“to prevent the use of the corporate form as a device (a) to avoid payment of 
individual income taxes and (b) to secure undue tax advantages over 
partnerships and unincorporated businesses,” which suggests it could have been 
styled as a penalty tax rather than the automatic tax imposed during the New 
 
 18. Editorial, Why Venture, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1944, at 4. See George B. Bryant Jr., The Tax 
Future: Peace Will Bring Little Relief for Individuals but Some for Business, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1944, 
at 1 (“It is pretty well agreed among the experts and tax committee members that present corporation 
taxes cannot be carried over into the post-war period. They would be too much of a drag on the 
economy.”). 
 19. A Brookings Institution report proposing a shareholder-credit method of integration was 
released in 1943, Lewis H. Kimmel, POSTWAR TAX POLICY AND BUSINESS EXPANSION (Brookings 
Institution, 1943), and Eustace Seligman proposed a near repeal of the corporate income tax in early 
1944, Eustace Seligman, A Post-War Program for Taxation of Corporations and Stockholders, 159 
COM. & FIN. CHRON. 889 (1944). 
 20. Carl Shoup, Three Plans for Post-War Taxation, 34 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 757 (1944). 
 21. BEARDSLEY RUML & H. CHR. SONNE, FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY: A MEMORANDUM 
PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE BUSINESS COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PLANNING 
ASSOCIATION (1944); Budget of $18 Billion, Abolition of Corporate Income Tax Urged as Post-War 
U.S. Policy, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1944, at 5; The New Argument, TIME, Aug. 7, 1944, at 76. 
 22. Harley L. Lutz, A Postwar Tax Program, 29 BULL. NAT’L TAX ASS’N 260, 262 (1944) 
(proposing a repeal of the corporate income tax in favor of a federal sales tax). 
 23. RUML & SONNE, supra note 21, at 9. In a footnote to a table in the appendix, the authors 
contemplate a sixteen percent rate on the undistributed-profits tax. Id. at 39. 
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Deal.24 In elaborating, Ruml and Sonne emphasized that in addition to 
distorting investment decisions, the corporate income tax imposed inequitable 
double taxation on corporate income. This was particularly troublesome for 
small stockholders because “the earnings are first taxed in the hands of the 
corporation at full, identical rates for all stockholders, and then that portion of 
the earnings distributed as dividends to stockholders is taxed again, but only in 
the latter case at progressive rates.”25 
A second reform proposal, dubbed the “Twin Cities Plan” because of its 
backing by a group of twenty-two high-ranking businessmen from Minneapolis 
and St. Paul, Minnesota, was almost the polar opposite of the Ruml–Sonne 
proposal.26 Rather than propose to supplant the corporate income tax, the Twin 
Cities group supported continuing the high corporate rates at 1942 levels, while 
cutting the excess profits tax and other wartime taxes and sharply reducing 
individual surtax and capital-gains rates.27 The thesis of the group’s proposal was 
“that relatively heavy corporate income tax rates are not as harmful to the 
private enterprise system as are heavy individual income tax rates, for the 
reason that the latter shut off at the source all possibility of venturing of capital 
by individuals.”28 After rejecting a variety of integration options as unwieldy or 
inequitable, the Twin Cities group proposed to relieve double taxation by 
excluding forty percent of dividends from the individual income tax at the 
shareholder level. This exclusion, described as “arbitrary” by contemporary 
observers,29 was justified by the group as ensuring that “in no case should the 
part of the burden paid by the stockholder exceed fifty percent of the dividend 
received,” which the group felt was the magic number required to maintain 
investment incentives.30 
The businessmen who proposed retaining high corporate tax rates were not 
perceived as charitable. Indeed, Carl Shoup suggested that the Twin Cities 
proposal “bears heavily the stamp of special interest. It is extraordinarily 
favorable to the sector of the economy that the members of the Twin Cities 
group represent.”31 Shoup characterized the proposal as more favorable to high-
income-bracket executives of moderately sized corporations who had invested 
most of their personal wealth in the corporation. For such businessmen, the 
lower individual rates and dividend exclusion may have made up for the high 
 
 24. Id. at 9. Contemporary commentators seemed to assume that it would be similar to the 1936 
undistributed-profits tax and would therefore be automatic rather than applied only in the event the 
government established fraud or tax avoidance. See Shoup, supra note 20, at 764. 
 25. RUML & SONNE, supra note 21, at 11. 
 26. TWIN CITIES RESEARCH BUREAU, THE TWIN CITIES PLAN: POSTWAR TAXES: A REALISTIC 
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF FEDERAL TAXATION (1944) [hereinafter TWIN CITIES]. 
 27. Id. at 12–13. 
 28. Id. 
 29. John V. Van Sickle, Reform of the Federal Taxes on Personal and Corporate Income, 34 AM. 
ECON. REV. 847, 847 (1944). 
 30. TWIN CITIES, supra note 26, at 16. 
 31. Shoup, supra note 20, at 758. 
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corporate rates. By contrast, Shoup speculated that the executive of a larger 
corporation with a diversified portfolio might have been more concerned about 
the corporate rate and less about the rate on individual stockholders.32 Perhaps 
on that basis, Shoup thought it the least likely of the three proposals to be 
adopted.33 
The third and final comprehensive tax reform proposal to be released in the 
summer of 1944 was the Committee for Economic Development’s Postwar 
Federal Tax Plan for High Employment.34 Much like the Ruml–Sonne proposal, 
the Committee for Economic Development saw the need to reduce rather than 
maintain corporate income tax rates. It proposed to return to the early days of 
the income tax, with corporate and individual normal rates each set at between 
sixteen and twenty percent and with dividends effectively exempted from the 
normal rate.35 That is, shareholders would be credited with the tax paid at the 
corporate level and this credit would be refundable in the event the tax 
exceeded the amount that would have been otherwise due.36 According to the 
Committee, this system, which was similar to the shareholder-credit system then 
in place in Britain,37 “would be equivalent to a withholding tax, on behalf of the 
stockholders, on corporate net income paid out in dividends.”38 
To at least partially address the criticism that the retained-earnings problem 
would remain for stockholders seeking to avoid subjecting corporate income to 
high surtax rates,39 the Committee recommended eventually eliminating the 
capital-gains preference.40 The Committee theorized that “the inclusion of these 
gains in the personal income tax base is the only way by which all corporate 
earnings—i.e., stockholders’ income—can be eventually subjected to the 
personal income tax.”41 Shoup pointed out that this failed to account for the 
inequity caused by a delay in taxation, but that it did seek to address the 
possible conversion of ordinary income from dividends to the lower-rate capital 
gains from sale of stock.42 
 
 32. See id. at 766–67. 
 33. Id. at 758. 
 34. RESEARCH COMM., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., A POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN FOR HIGH 
EMPLOYMENT (1944) [hereinafter POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN]. See also John H. Crider, Business 
Body Asks Corporate Tax End as Way to Job Peak, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1944, at 1. 
 35. POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN, supra note 34, at 27, 30, 34. 
 36. Id. at 30. 
 37. See Rebecca Newman Golub, The Postwar Tax Structure—A Discussion of Four Leading 
Plans, 78 J. ACCT. 292, 294 (1944) (describing the Committee’s approach); HAROLD M. GROVES, 
POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 68 (1946) (describing Great Britain’s shareholder-
credit system). 
 38. POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN, supra note 34, at 34. 
 39. See Would End Corporate Tax: Ruml of Committee Says Peril Is Amassing Unneeded Funds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1944, at 15 (suggesting that “one of the difficulties of administering the plan would 
be to prevent corporations from accumulating unneeded surpluses”). 
 40. POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN, supra note 34, at 31. 
 41. Id. at 32. 
 42. Shoup, supra note 20, at 768. 
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Other groups and individuals recommended variants of these three primary 
tax reform proposals during the summer and fall of 1944. The American 
Taxpayers Association and the Post-War Planning Committee of the 
Commerce and Industry Association of New York each proposed major tax 
overhauls, both advocating the repeal or partial relief of double taxation.43 The 
former organization had been trumpeting the double-tax issue since at least the 
summer of 1943, proclaiming in its newsletter that “[t]he great inequity in the 
corporate tax system arises from the double taxation of corporate earnings paid 
out in dividends.”44 The American Institute of Accountants followed with its 
own recommendations, advising that “[t]he present double taxation of 
corporate income . . . should be eliminated as soon as revenue needs permit.”45 
Banker George Barnes noted that “[a]mong the most-discussed proposals with 
business men, at least, are those for elimination of corporation taxes as a means 
to encourage business expansion and end the double taxation of the 
shareholder’s dividends.”46 Although he found it unrealistic to expect the 
complete end to the corporate income tax, he proposed using a corporate 
franchise tax to lessen reliance on the income tax and a shareholder credit to 
alleviate double taxation.47 As journalist Godfrey Nelson observed in a New 
York Times article, “The nation appears to have become tax-conscious . . . . 
When business men, economists and even leaders of labor organizations come 
out for the elimination of taxes on the income of corporations, we realize that 
courageous thinking is being devoted to the subject of taxation.”48 
The number and intensity of proposals quickly received Congressional 
attention. By December 1944, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation planned to meet with experts in Congress and at the Treasury to 
discuss postwar tax reform.49 Yet the resulting recommendations were only 
interim measures. In May of 1945, the Joint Committee announced a “five point 
program” involving increased excess profits tax exemptions and provisions such 
as accelerated refund provisions for loss carrybacks and amortization 
deductions, “designed to improve the cash position of business.” This was 
signed into law later that summer.50 
 
 43. AM. TAXPAYERS ASS’N, WHY THE 25 PERCENT LIMIT ON FEDERAL TAXES . . . TAX 
INSURANCE TO GIVE TAXPAYERS A CHANCE 8 (1944); POST-WAR PLANNING COMM., COMMERCE & 
INDUS. ASS’N OF N.Y., WINNING THE WAR AND THE PEACE: A PROGRAM OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
18–19 (1944). 
 44. AM. TAXPAYERS ASS’N, TAX INFORMATION SERIES NO. 42, DOUBLE TAXATION—ITS 
BLIGHTING EFFECTS 1 (1943). 
 45. Postwar Taxation: Recommendations by the Committee on Federal Taxation of the American 
Institute of Accountants, 78 J. ACCT. 361, 363 (1944). 
 46. Barnes, supra note 17, at 1. 
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. Godfrey N. Nelson, Tax Planning Now Hailed as Helpful, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1944, at S5. 
 49. Bryant, supra note 18. 
 50. Tax Relief Bill Is Sent to Truman, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1945, at 1. 
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Groups continued to put forward tax reform proposals in the fall of 1945, 
but to no avail. The Committee on Post-War Tax Policy, a group of prominent 
economists, lawyers, and businessmen, released a report in the fall of 1945 
advocating the adoption of a shareholder credit for the amount of tax paid at 
the corporate level for dividends paid to the shareholder.51 Both the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce proposed 
sharp cuts in individual and corporate rates.52 As a writer for Fortune Magazine 
observed, though, all “[t]he tax planners are silent on timing.”53 Like the reform 
proposals that came earlier, each new proposal ended up being placed on the 
shelf. 
B.  Corporate Tax Reform Deferred 
The corporate tax reform movement stalled in part because the focus turned 
to repealing the excess profits tax. The excess profits tax had long been opposed 
by business, but this opposition only grew stronger with the end of the war. 
Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson had described the tax as “erratic and in many 
instances . . . inequitable” and “the strongest impediment to reconversion” of 
the economy after the war.54 Nevertheless, as President Truman declared in his 
message to Congress on September 6, 1945, “[A] total war effort cannot be 
liquidated overnight.”55 War expenditures were likely to continue at a brisk pace 
in the immediate aftermath, with the total 1946 budget expected to be at least 
seven times its 1940 size.56 Thus, a transitional tax bill, introduced in the House 
in 1945, proposed to defer repeal of the excess profits tax until 1947 and to 
immediately cut corporate tax rates. The Ways and Means Committee 
explained that while it “recognize[d] the desirability of having no excess-profits 
tax in our peacetime tax structure,” it did not believe that “the complete 
elimination of the excess profits tax for 1946 was as desirable as the reduction of 
other corporate taxes which affect all corporations with taxable income.” 57 
According to the Committee report, only 20,000 corporations would be subject 
to the excess profits tax in 1946, whereas 260,000 corporations would be subject 
to the corporate income tax.58 
 
 51. COMM. ON POSTWAR TAX POLICY, A TAX PROGRAM FOR A SOLVENT AMERICA 17 (1945); 
see also Congress Is Urged to Cut Taxes 50%, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1945, at 33. 
 52. C.P. Trussell, George Forecasts 5 Billion Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1945, at 15. 
 53. Taxes After the War, FORTUNE, Dec. 1944, at 121, 243. 
 54. Revenue Act of 1945: Hearings on H.R. 4309 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 79th Cong. 27–28 
(1945) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of Treasury); see also 
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 185 (1947) (noting that Vinson believed the excess 
profits tax was “too erratic a tax engine to turn loose for even one full year of the postwar period”). 
 55. Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period, 
1945 PUB. PAPERS 263, 294 (Sept. 6, 1945). 
 56. PAUL, supra note 54, at 184. 
 57. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1106, at 9–10 (1945). 
 58. Bill Cutting Corporate and Individual Taxes $5.3 Billion Due for House Passage Today, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 11, 1945, at 5. 
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The Committee’s report in favor of broader corporate tax reform did 
nothing to deter opposition to the deferral of excess profits tax repeal.59 The 
New York Times reported that the delayed repeal was “the most controversial 
issue” in the bill.60 Business groups—including the National Association of State 
Chambers of Commerce, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and the National Retail Dry Goods 
Association—lined up in favor of immediate repeal of the excess profits tax, 
even if it came at the cost of higher corporate tax rates.61 In part, these groups 
might have been concerned that delayed repeal would be no repeal at all. Texas 
Senator Tom Connally may have contributed to such fear, characterizing the tax 
as “permanently sound” and moving to reduce excess profit tax rates rather 
than repeal the tax altogether.62 Congress eventually acceded to such pressure 
and repealed the excess profits tax effective immediately, deferring action on 
broader corporate tax reform measures such as double taxation. 
This focus on the excess profits tax was certainly not itself a rejection of 
corporate tax reform, although it effectively served that end. Shoup observed 
that “[t]he excess profits tax is assumed by all of the plans to be unsuited to a 
peacetime economy.”63 The Committee for Economic Development report and 
the Twin Cities Plan both explicitly recommended repeal of the excess profits 
tax.64 The Twin Cities Plan noted that “[t]he excess profits tax is a creature of 
the war, and has no place in a peacetime tax program.”65 The American 
Taxpayers Association made that tax its top priority, recommending that the 
group “[u]rge repeal of the Excess Profits Tax immediately when ‘firing’ ceases 
in the present war.”66 In all the proposals, though, excess profits tax repeal was 
intended to be only the first step toward major business tax reform. 
Nevertheless, corporate tax reform appeared to fall off the postwar agenda 
altogether after the repeal of the excess profits tax. 
Several factors likely contributed to the continued deferral of corporate tax 
reform even after the excess profits tax controversy passed. One was the high 
priority given to balancing the budget. The 1945 Act had created a budgetary 
mess: the repeal of the excess profits tax was only one of many provisions that 
resulted in a significant loss of revenue. The hope appeared to be that all of the 
 
 59. See, e.g., William S. White, Business, Labor Offer Tax Views, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1945, at 3 
(describing the continuing opposition of the National Association of State Chambers of Commerce and 
others to the bill). 
 60. C.P. Trussell, Profits-Tax Clash Faces Conferees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1945, at 1. 
 61. White, supra note 59; Hearings, supra note 54, at 171 (statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, 
Chairman, Committee on Federal Finance, Chamber of Commerce of the United States); id. at 202 
(statement of H.E. Humphreys Jr., Chairman, Finance Committee, United States Rubber Co., and 
Chairman, Taxation Committee, National Association of Manufacturers); id. at 206 (statement of Jay 
Iglauer, Chairman, Taxation Committee, National Retail Dry Goods Association). 
 62. PAUL, supra note 54, at 192. 
 63. Shoup, supra note 20, at 762. 
 64. See POSTWAR FEDERAL TAX PLAN, supra note 34, at 34. 
 65. TWIN CITIES, supra note 26, at 13. 
 66. AM. TAXPAYERS ASS’N, supra note 44, at 3. 
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tax cuts would revive the economy and increase profits and taxable income 
overall. Randolph Paul called this “a revival of nostalgic enthusiasm for the 
Andrew Mellon economics of the twenties, with member after member 
recalling those glorious days of normalcy when taxes were reduced and the 
budget was balanced.”67 It soon became readily apparent, though, that actually 
balancing the budget was an unrealistic goal.68 
The budget difficulties were often cited as a justification for deferring 
corporate tax reform. In 1945, House Ways and Means Chairman Robert 
Doughton warned that “[t]here is nothing to justify the hope now that there will 
be further corporation tax cuts” until there was “a balanced budget or a near-
balanced budget.”69 When asked about double taxation, Doughton responded, 
“Oh, yes, that’s likely to come up. That’s an old subject and it’s likely to be an 
old one after some one else becomes chairman of this committee.”70 
The National Association of Manufacturers actually seemed to agree with 
Doughton’s assessment. One columnist reported that 
[i]t has been the considered conclusion of the N.A.M. that the most pressing need in 
tax revision is not a general reduction in the corporate tax structure. This may seem a 
strange conclusion from a group the members of which pay a large proportion of 
corporate taxes. But the facts justify this position. . . . The immediate demand of the 
N.A.M. is a balanced budget, with appropriate provision for debt retirement.71 
In fact, when the National Association of Manufacturers outlined a tax 
reform plan in testimony before the Ways and Means Committee in 1947, it 
focused specifically on individual- and capital-gains rate cuts and recommended 
that corporate tax reform, including double-tax relief, “be deferred until federal 
fiscal needs are stabilized at lower peacetime levels.”72 
Excess profits tax repeal also permitted politicians to call for a shift from 
business-tax relief to individual-tax relief. As Randolph Paul reported, “Ever 
since the tax reduction given so generously to corporations by the 1945 act, 
strong pressure had been applied to Congress for a compensating reduction to 
individual income taxpayers.”73 Thus, when several key members of the Ways 
and Means Committee were asked in late 1946 whether corporate tax relief was 
on the agenda, they responded, “Not before 1948.”74 Their explanation was that 
“[c]orporations ‘fared pretty well last year . . . . Now it’s time for individual 
taxpayers to get a break.’”75 House Ways and Means Committee Chairman 
Harold Knutson even suggested that Republicans had reached an 
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“understanding” with President Truman in 1945 that support for business tax 
cuts at that time would be followed by more-general, individual-income-tax 
relief in the following year or two.76 
Another contributing factor to the failure to fulfill the promise of corporate 
tax reform was that business groups could not themselves agree on a course of 
action. As the Wall Street Journal reported, 
Business itself is far from agreed as to what it wants and a large number of conflicting 
plans have been submitted to the Treasury and to Congress . . . . Double taxation is 
the biggest snag in evolving a definite tax policy measure . . . . Sixty relief plans to cure 
this one evil are evidence of the widely divergent views on how to reduce double 
taxation.77 
In December 1946, a Treasury study of the postwar corporate tax structure 
summarized the nature of the problem: 
There are major differences of opinion as to postwar taxation of corporate income. 
Many desire radical changes in the present system. Others wish no basic revision. Not 
all those who favor ultimate elimination of the corporate tax would recommend this 
step immediately. Moreover, many who approve the present type of corporate tax 
favor lower rates and other modifications.78 
These problems were only compounded by what one observer described as 
“huge gaps in our knowledge of how the economy operates.”79 Richard Goode, 
the author of the 1946 Treasury study, told a group of executives and tax 
professionals that “[c]orporate tax reform is complicated by uncertainty as to 
the real effects of the present system.”80 Amid such uncertainty, no action was 
often preferable to radical change, especially for interest groups attempting to 
assess whose ox was being gored under each plan. 
Perhaps the most compelling explanation for the decline in the fervor of 
corporate tax reform advocates is that the circumstances that originally gave 
rise to the reform movement in 1944 had changed. By 1946, the predictions of 
postwar economic ruin had been disproven. Businesses had already started to 
transition to the postwar economy, and the repeal of the excess profits tax had 
increased the percentage of retained earnings available for reinvestment. Of the 
$3.5 billion in new capital raised in the market in 1946, $1.5 billion came from 
the issuance of new common or preferred stock, which was considered a 
relatively normal debt-to-equity ratio.81 By contrast, the net acquisition of 
corporate stocks by individuals, which had been as high as $4.7 billion in 1929, 
had stood at only $519 million in 1944 when the flurry of proposals for the 
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integration of the corporate and individual income taxes had begun.82 Thus, with 
capital needs a bit less pressing, corporate managers could focus their attention 
on more-personally important, entity-level concerns and leave shareholders to 
fight the double-taxation fight on their own. Though the report of a special 
House Ways and Means tax-study committee revived the issue in the fall of 
1947,83 no action was taken. 
C.  A Brief Revival of Reform Efforts 
Starting in 1948, the focus switched from reform to fighting against an 
increased corporate tax burden. In his 1948 budget message to Congress, 
President Harry Truman preached revenue neutrality in budgeting, reminding 
Congress that “[t]he expenditures of the Federal Government are still 
inescapably dominated by the war and its aftermath.”84 Truman had vetoed an 
across-the-board income-tax cut in 1947—only the second presidential veto of a 
tax bill in American history.85 To pay now for a decrease in individual income 
taxes, he proposed a “corresponding increase in corporation taxes.”86 Though 
Truman had always been focused on the budget, his proposal to reject the status 
quo in favor of shifting taxes from individuals to businesses was new.87 Truman’s 
proposals were reported to be “harmful and short-sighted,” “obviously 
designed for purely political appeal.”88 
Truman’s specific proposal for increased corporate taxes—the revival of a 
modified form of the excess profits tax—was even more galling for business. 
The major modifications—lowering the excess profits tax rate slightly from its 
World War II peak of 85.5% to 75% and increasing the exemption for the 
protection of small businesses—did little to mollify the almost 22,000 larger 
corporations that would be have been subject to the new levy.89 The Wall Street 
Journal called it “tax foolishness” and Congressional leaders on both sides of 
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the aisle denounced it.90 Despite the prominent support of people like Bernard 
Baruch,91 revival of the excess profits tax never gained much traction. 
Although opponents managed to resist Truman’s excess profits tax in early 
1948, a corporate tax increase—possibly in the form of an excess profits tax—
remained a threat. The budget situation deteriorated during 1948, and forecasts 
of surplus proved inaccurate. Truman was adamantly opposed to any form of 
deficit financing, and experts predicted a tax increase given the reality that 
defense spending and foreign aid could still not be easily cut.92 This reportedly 
gave businessmen “the jitters,” with many feeling like they had targets on their 
chests.93 According to the Wall Street Journal, “Odds favor[ed] an increase in 
corporate taxes next year [in 1949], probably in the form of an excess-profits 
tax.”94 
Others were less confident about an excess profits tax but did agree that a 
corporate tax increase was likely. J.S. Seidman, one of the leading tax 
authorities of the day, explained that 
[t]his . . . is the popular approach and politically appealing. It will also have the 
justification from the fact that in comparison with war taxes, the subsequent removal 
of the excess profits tax has cut the corporate tax rate from 95 per cent to 38 per cent 
whereas the top rate on individuals has been reduced from 94 per cent to only 85 per 
cent.95 
As Seideman suggested, congressional sentiment for some kind of increase 
in the corporate tax was growing, with the only question being the form such an 
increase would take.96 The best compromise business interests and legislators 
could manage was an ultimately unsuccessful proposal to forego a rate increase 
in favor of accelerating corporate tax payments by about six months in 1950.97 
An economic downturn from 1948 through 1949 not only helped convince 
Truman to take tax increases off the table,98 but also revived concerns about 
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equity capital.99 Although naysayers contended that savings were adequate,100 
those concerned about equity investment cited the larger equity needs of the 
postwar economy. The head of the Business Structure Division of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce reflected that 
huge capital requirements for expansion of plant and equipment facilities to take care 
of postwar markets and technological advances . . . inevitably led to a growing 
pressure of demand upon the available sources of funds for business investment—
focusing attention for the first time in many years on possible deficiencies in the 
supply of capital, particularly equity capital.101 
The president of the New York Stock Exchange likewise warned that “the 
market for equity securities is so anemic that it can absorb only a limited 
volume of new shares.”102 
The double-tax system was one obvious target of blame for this shortfall in 
stock investing. The Chairman of General Electric Company complained that 
“the present double taxation of dividends is not only inequitable . . . but is a 
serious deterrent to investment in equity securities.”103 Editors of the Wall Street 
Journal concurred: “[D]ouble taxation of corporate profits paid out in dividends 
not only reduces the amount of capital available for investment in productive 
enterprise but goes a long way towards destroying the incentive to venture that 
has contributed so materially to this country’s expansion.”104 
This backlash reopened the door for corporate tax reform proposals. If 
double taxation was thought to hinder corporate financing, business and its 
supporters wanted it removed. Thus, Republican Congressman John Byrnes of 
Wisconsin introduced a bill proposing that shareholders be granted a tax credit 
equal to as much as twenty percent of dividends they had received, up to a 
maximum of $2000. Noting “‘serious implications’ in the current shift from 
equity financing to debt financing,” Byrnes urged that “means . . . be found to 
attract individuals in the lower income brackets into corporate financing.”105 
Similar proposals came from the other side of the aisle, as Democratic 
Representative Walter Lynch of New York offered a measure that included a 
ten-percent shareholder credit for dividends.106 Private groups such as the 
 
 99. See, e.g., Stanley L. Miller, The Equity Capital Problem, 26 HARV. BUS. REV. 671, 672 (1948). 
 100. See, e.g., Randolph E. Paul, Cold War Taxation Policy, 4 TAX L. REV. 35, 42 (1948); cf. Paul L. 
Howell, The Effects of Federal Income Taxation on the Form of External Financing by Business, 4 J. 
FIN. 208, 221 (1949) (concluding that although tax rates did affect the incentives to invest, the equity 
crunch had not yet reached a crisis of national proportions). 
 101. Irwin Friend, Business Financing in the Postwar Period, SURV. CURRENT BUS., Mar. 1948, at 
10. 
 102. Schram Sees Threat of Nationalization in Federal Tax Policies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1948, 
quoted in PAUL, supra note 100, at 41. 
 103. GE Chairman Urges Congress to Stimulate Investment in Common Stocks by Easing Business 
Tax Laws, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1949, at 2. 
 104. Editorial, Should be Tax “Musts,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1949, at 4. 
 105. Dividend Credits in Taxes Proposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1949, at 37. 
 106. House Democrat Asks Cuts in Excise, Capital Gains, Dividend Taxes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 
1949, at 3. 
BANK 9/4/2010 11:03:39 AM 
Winter 2010] POST–WORLD WAR II CORPORATE TAX REFORM 221 
Brookings Institution rereleased integration plans from the World War II and 
postwar era.107 
Although these proposals expressed concern about a lack of money coming 
into corporations, others were concerned about the lack of money leaving 
corporations in the form of dividends. One member of Congress called for a 
study of the practice of retaining corporate earnings as a means to avoid double 
taxation, suggesting that corporations “should be required to pay out in 
dividends at least two-thirds of their earnings.”108 The Los Angeles Times 
observed that “[t]he ghost of the undistributed profits tax walks again in 
Washington,” and quoted J.S. Seidman as saying that “serious consideration is 
being given to some form of undistributed profits tax on corporations.”109 
This brief revival of the corporate tax reform movement began to backslide 
around the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. Even before North Korea 
crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea in June 1950, congressional 
leaders and administration representatives had hinted that a corporate tax 
increase could replace wartime excise taxes.110 The House Ways and Means 
Committee began to consider a pre–Korean War return to the excess profits 
tax, which would, in the opinion of the sponsor of the bill proposing the 
measure, “tax the few corporations with postwar profits in many cases even 
above the peak wartime earnings.”111 According to the New York Times, “[I]f 
the budget deficit is not to be widened further, rather than narrowed, the taxes 
will come out of the hide of the country’s corporations, in one form or 
another.”112 
With the onset of hostilities in Korea, business was once again diverted from 
integration efforts to an ultimately unsuccessful fight against an excess profits 
tax. Business lobbyists turned out in full force at House hearings on such a tax.113 
Ralph Button of the National Retail Dry Goods Association lamented that 
“[a]n equitable excess-profits tax law cannot be written.”114 A newly formed 
group comprised of officers from more than 100 leading corporations—the 
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Business Committee on Emergency Corporate Taxation—was particularly 
strident in opposing an excess profits tax. The group’s leader, Beardsley Ruml, 
criticized excess profits taxation as “an evil brew of inequity, exception, 
exemption and privilege.”115 Another representative remarked that he “would 
greatly favor a straight increase in the present corporate tax at whatever level 
necessary to raise the revenue” rather than a revival of the profits levy.116 
Many of those introducing corporate tax reform proposals between 1944 
and 1946 again proposed corporate tax increases in 1950 as an alternative to the 
excess profits tax. The National Association of Manufacturers proposed what 
was described as a “special ‘defense tax,’ based on percentages of the regular 
corporate tax,” as a substitute for an excess profits tax.117 According to The 
Nation, the top rate of thirty percent was designed so that “corporations could 
be sure of retaining 51.3 per cent of their gross profits.”118 The Chamber of 
Commerce of the State of New York preferred a graduated retail sales tax with 
higher rates on luxuries than necessities, but noted that, “should Congress 
choose not to enact such a defense, graduated retail sales tax, then there should 
be further and temporary increases in the corporate tax rate up toward a top 
limit of 50 per cent . . . in preference to any so-called excess profits tax.”119 The 
Committee on Economic Development also introduced its own plan, which 
included a temporary “defense profits tax” consisting of a flat fifteen percent 
tax on corporate profits on top of a somewhat reduced normal corporate tax 
rate of thirty-eight percent.120 No group, however, included double-tax relief in 
its proposals. As Charlie Merrill of the Merrill Lynch brokerage house 
lamented, “There is no organized pressure group representing investors . . . . 
Yet there are more than six million investors who could make their voices heard 
from coast to coast.”121 
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III 
1954 AND BEYOND 
A.  Why Dividend Tax Relief Now? 
1. Continued Concerns over Declining Equity Investment 
The Korean War had temporarily derailed integration plans, but concerns 
about declining equity investment continued to simmer. In 1951, the New York 
Times reported that “[o]nly about 6 per cent of our huge national income is now 
finding its way into [business enterprise],” compared with up to eighteen 
percent under normal conditions.122 According to estimates prepared by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, a mere eight percent of aggregate liquid 
individual savings went toward the net purchase of equity securities such as 
common stock.123 Moreover, not only did the percentage of new investments 
drop, but so did the total number of shareholders—from approximately ten 
million in 1930 to six million by 1952.124 By 1953, the volume of trading on the 
New York Stock Exchange had reached a low point of fewer than one million 
shares, and G. Keith Funston, the president of the Exchange, subsequently 
complained that “[n]ew enterprises seeking to create new wealth and 
productivity are unable to attract the equity capital we need.”125 
Instead of purchasing stock, many wealthy individuals sought tax-preferred 
investment vehicles such as life insurance or municipal bonds. For the former, 
the investment increment in the policy was exempt from tax. For the latter, the 
interest paid out by the bonds was tax-exempt. Although both paid lower 
returns than conventional investments, high individual tax rates made the tax 
exemption quite valuable. In the case of life insurance, a Harvard Business 
School study on the effects of taxation on individual investment found that 
approximately one-half of individuals who reported that tax concerns motivated 
their decisions to buy insurance and annuities were either high-income- or high-
net-wealth individuals.126 An even more significant example was the case of 
individual holdings of state and local securities, which almost doubled from $7 
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billion between 1944 and 1947 to $12 billion by 1953.127 The ownership of such 
tax-exempt municipal securities was highly concentrated in higher-income 
individuals.128 Northwestern University law professor William Cary, who later 
headed the Securities and Exchange Commission under President Kennedy, 
observed that, at least in part, “the credit for dividends can be described as an 
inducement to counteract the existing tax exemption of insurance and 
municipal bonds.”129 
This declining appetite for stock investment was likely worsened by the 
postwar recession that commenced in the fall of 1953. Although brief and mild 
in comparison to the other economic downturns during the 1950s, the recession 
exacted a nontrivial price in terms of business failures, a decline in stock prices, 
and decreases in residential construction and orders for durable goods.130 Gross 
national product dropped as much as three percent and unemployment rose 
from 2.5% to 6.1%.131 Most notably for purposes of the taxation of corporate 
dividends, the net acquisition of corporate stocks dropped sharply during and 
immediately following the war, from a high of $1.6 billion in 1951 to $1 billion in 
1952, $700 million in 1953, and a post–World War II low of $300 million by 
1954.132 
There was a determined push to broaden the base of stock ownership to 
compensate for the departure of wealthier individuals. As Marshall Ketchum of 
the University of Chicago had observed, the problem was that “[t]he upper 
income classes no longer have such large percentages of total disposable 
incomes with which to purchase stocks,” while “[t]he lower-income classes have 
increased incomes, increased disposable incomes, and increased savings, but 
they are unacquainted with common stocks and with the manner of acquiring 
them.”133 In response, the New York Stock Exchange initiated an advertising 
campaign, entitled “Own Your Share of American Business,” complete with 
performances from the popular puppet show Kukla, Fran, and Ollie, to promote 
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stock investment among the middle class.134 The banks followed suit with the 
“Quimby Plan,” which facilitated individual stock ownership by allowing 
customers to purchase shares directly through their local banks.135 At the same 
time, retail brokerage houses such as Merrill Lynch started training their 
brokers on how to serve smaller investors.136 None of this, however, appreciably 
increased the amount of available capital. 
The drop in stock investing forced businesses to seek other forms of 
financing. G. Keith Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange, noted 
that companies were increasingly resorting to debt financing because of the 
dearth of equity capital: 
For the seven years, 1946–1952, the long-term debt financing and bank loans of 
corporate industry totaled $40 billion, more than three and a half times the $11 billion 
obtained from new stock issues. Government officials, economists and business 
leaders alike have warned of the dangers inherent in this trend.137 
This policy soon became difficult, though, because inflation concerns had 
led the Federal Reserve Board, with the Eisenhower Administration’s blessing 
and support, to pursue a restrictive credit policy complete with rising interest 
rates.138 When companies found debt too expensive, they tried to reduce 
dividends and rely more on retained earnings, which reportedly further 
depressed stock prices. J. Kirk Eads of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce wrote 
in the Chamber’s in-house publication that 
[b]efore World War II—in 1939—corporations as a group paid out about 76 per cent 
of their after-tax earnings to their stockholders. Since the war, this percentage has 
fallen as low as 35 per cent. This drop in the percentage, and the corresponding effect 
on the attractiveness of investment in corporate stocks, is in large part a result of the 
double taxation problem, since corporations find outside capital harder to obtain and 
must depend more on retained earnings for their growth.139 
As profits declined during the recession, though, even the retained-earnings 
strategy became infeasible. 
Like Eads, many observers attributed at least part of the blame for the lack 
of equity capital to the continued high income-tax rates, particularly on 
dividend income. As early as a symposium of the Tax Institute held in 1950, 
William Casey remarked that the effect of double taxation and the growing 
availability of more favorably taxed investments such as municipal bonds and 
real estate “have clearly reflected themselves in the fact that corporate stock 
has consistently sold at a lower ratio to earnings, and is still doing so in the 
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current bull market, than ever before.”140 The New York Stock Exchange’s 
Funston told the House Ways and Means Committee in July of 1953 that 
“[t]axation of capital gains and double taxation of dividends are Federally-
erected twin dams holding back the free flow of life-giving venture capital into 
American industry.”141 Although this attempt to pin an equity crisis on double 
taxation had its dissenters,142 others acknowledged that the tax provisions, in 
combination with an economic downturn, might have had some effect.143 In any 
event, the notion that the taxation of dividends was hurting equity investment 
had clearly become a mainstream view. Even the Saturday Evening Post 
observed that “double taxation can only retard the flow of risk capital into new 
ventures.”144 
2. Dividend-Tax Relief as a Response to the Equity Crisis 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Republican president in twenty years, 
initially appeared unlikely to respond to concerns about declining equity 
investment. In fact, Republican congressmen were upset because his positions 
on taxation appeared to resemble those of President Truman prior to the 
Korean War.145 Like Truman, Eisenhower insisted that a balanced budget take 
precedence over cutting taxes.146 With a deficit of $9.4 billion for fiscal year 1953 
expected to grow to as high as $11 billion in 1954,147 Eisenhower needed to raise 
revenues. Though he did not explicitly propose increasing the corporate tax rate 
and reenacting an excess profits tax, as Truman had, he effectively did the same 
thing by asking Congress in May of 1953 to extend the excess profits tax six 
months past its expiration date and to rescind a scheduled reduction in the 
corporate tax rate from fifty-two to forty-seven percent.148 
Unlike with Truman, Eisenhower’s concerns were at least publicly 
acknowledged by business, perhaps due to longer-term confidence about his tax 
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plans.149 John Biggers, chairman of the Business Advisory Council, explained 
that “much as we business men want to see an end to the excess profits tax and 
a reduction in individual income taxes, we don’t feel that such reductions should 
be made before a balanced budget is achieved or is at least in sight.”150 Even 
Gordon Grand, CEO of Olin Industries, compared his quest for the elimination 
of double taxation of dividends to Don Quixote’s assault on the windmills, 
noting that all proposals must “recognize the existence of three harsh realities—
high federal expenditures, a balanced-budget objective and the fact that, as a 
general rule, Congressmen prefer to be reelected.”151 
Business was rewarded for its patience on tax reform. In his January 1954 
State of the Union address, Eisenhower called for a complete overhaul of the 
entire tax system to “remove the more glaring tax inequities.”152 In his Budget 
Message later that month, Eisenhower specifically identified double taxation as 
one such “glaring inequity,” proposing to remove it “by allowing stockholders a 
credit against their own income taxes as a partial offset for the corporate tax 
previously paid.”153 Under his proposal for addressing double taxation, which 
had already been approved by the Ways and Means Committee,154 the first $50 
of dividends would be excluded from income, rising to the first $100 of 
dividends starting in 1955. In addition, a tax credit of five percent would be 
permitted on dividend income beyond the exclusion, rising to ten percent in 
1955 and fifteen percent in 1956.155 The decision to rely on a shareholder 
exemption and tax credit, rather than on a corporate credit or deduction, was 
apparently to avoid discriminating between distributed and undistributed 
profits, thereby reviving the hated undistributed-profits tax.156 
The dividend-tax proposal was designed in large measure to respond to the 
equity crunch. A Ways and Means Committee spokesman said that the 
proposal was “designed to stimulate a flow of equity capital,”157 and the New 
York Times reported that “[o]ne of the avowed aims of the plan is to encourage 
the purchase of stocks and thus give business the capital needed for 
modernization and expansion that will help keep the country at a high level of 
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economic activity.”158 The Administration’s supporters used this argument 
frequently. Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey testified that double 
taxation 
has restricted the market for shares of a stock in companies which want to expand and 
has forced them to borrow money instead of selling shares in their future. In the past 
ten years better than 75 per cent of private industry financing has been done by going 
in debt instead of selling shares.159 
Similarly, Representative Thomas E. Martin of Iowa declared that “[d]ouble 
taxation of dividends on corporation stock causes many people to invest their 
funds in tax-exempt bonds rather than invest them as risk capital.” According to 
Martin, this 
caused corporations to turn to bonded indebtedness rather than common stock to 
keep their business going, even though heavily bonded indebtedness makes any 
business organization especially vulnerable to adversity when their continued 
operation is most important.160 
The New York Times predicted that this provision “would do about as much 
as any proposal of the President’s tax program to give business a much wanted 
shot in the arm.161 
The dividend-tax-relief proposal “proved to be one of the thorniest and 
most controversial considered in writing the revenue bill.”162 Though the bill as a 
whole was developed with remarkable speed, considering its comprehensive 
nature, the dividend-tax provisions proved to be the one speed bump. As one 
attorney involved with the legislation explained: “Such Congressional speed 
was possible because there was little Congressional controversy over the 
technical portions of the bill. Only on policy questions, especially the provisions 
for dividend-tax relief, was there strong difference[] of opinion.”163 This 
opposition came primarily from organized labor, with the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations launching a grassroots effort against the provision.164 
One of the principal criticisms of dividend-tax relief was that an increased 
exemption for all individual income tax payers should come before corporate 
tax reform.165 Democrats “ridiculed the administration’s program as a ‘trickle 
down’ policy that attempted to indirectly help the unemployed by granting tax 
relief to corporations and the rich.”166 The New York Times reported that 
[t]he section on dividend income is the big fighting point in the bill as it passed the 
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House. The provision has drawn fire from many Democrats on the ground that it will 
chiefly aid the rich. Some committee members have said they will seek to strike it 
from the bill.167 
This controversy appeared to be a consequence of the nearly zero-sum 
nature of the tax bill, which was reportedly designed to obtain “maximum 
reform with a minimum loss of revenue.”168 The fear was that if shareholders 
won, then nonshareholders were likely, in some fashion, to lose. Pennsylvania’s 
Democratic representative characterized the dividend-tax-credit provision as 
“an attempt to make the man who earns his bread by the sweat of his brow pay 
more and more of the $50 billion cold war with Russia . . . while . . . letting the 
investor, the corporation and the large stockholder pay less and less.”169 
For the most part, Democratic opposition was “a synthetic controversy” 
designed to take advantage of election-year politics and the Republicans’ 
rejection of individual relief in favor of dividend-tax reform.170 Republican 
members of the Ways and Means Committee had predicted that it would 
become “political dynamite” that could be used by Democrats as proof that 
Eisenhower and the Republicans were favoring the “rich man” over the “little 
fellow.”171 Such predictions proved largely true. According to the New York 
Times, “The fight against the dividend provision . . . was waged in the belief that 
it would provide a top campaign issue for the Democrats” in the fall.172 
Although supporters pointed out that the dividend-tax exclusion and credit 
were not quite the giveaway that was often portrayed,173 many attributed the 
Democrats’ eventual success in the congressional elections to the efforts they 
took to substitute a general tax cut available to all individuals for the dividend-
tax cut for shareholders.174 
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The Republicans succeeded in enacting some dividend-tax relief, but theirs 
was ultimately a “limited” victory.175 The legislation’s four-percent dividend-tax 
credit was called a “watered down version” of Eisenhower’s initial proposal for 
a fifteen-percent shareholder credit within three years.176 Columbia economics 
professor Carl Shoup noted that 
the amounts of change are so small that in most cases they make no notable difference 
in the pattern of tax distribution[] from the viewpoint of tax equity. . . . [,] [and] a 
credit of only 4 per cent and an exclusion of only $50 are not likely to influence the 
sum total of investment appreciably.177 
Not only was the relief limited, but it was short-lived. The dividend-tax 
credit was ultimately repealed in 1964 as part of John F. Kennedy’s plan to 
reduce corporate and individual tax rates and broaden the tax base.178 The 
exemption remained for much longer, but eventually was repealed as well as 
part of the 1986 tax reform.179 
B. Why Was Integration So Limited? 
The modest dividend-tax relief enacted was a somewhat surprising result for 
Eisenhower, especially given reports that “[t]he dividend provision was 
regarded by the Administration as one of the bill’s two most important 
features.”180 His other top priority—an accelerated depreciation provision—was 
somewhat less controversial and survived largely as proposed.181 
Some observers have concluded that the Administration and its supporters 
in Congress themselves downgraded integration as a priority. Professor Gary 
Reichard speculated that “[i]n all likelihood, Senate leaders relaxed party 
discipline on the dividend provision in order to concentrate their energies on 
defeating the drive for the $700 individual exemption, which the administration 
had viewed all along as the greater threat to its program.”182 This is what the 
Democrats intended when they introduced the proposal for an increase in the 
individual exemption and reframed the debate as one between tax cuts for the 
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rich or the poor and middle class.183 Downsizing the dividend-tax relief also ties 
into Eisenhower’s reluctance to exacerbate the budget situation and risk 
inflation by targeting lower-income taxpayers for cuts that would increase 
consumer spending.184 More broadly, the sheer size and scope of the bill suggests 
there were numerous other potential tradeoffs that could have interceded. A 
New York Times editorial speculated, “The Administration would probably 
admit that as between reform of the law affecting the taxation of dividends, on 
the one hand, and reform of the existing mandatory high rigid price supports for 
‘basic’ farm commodities, the latter was decidedly the more urgent.”185 
Nevertheless, all of this prompts this question: Why did corporate managers not 
put up more of a fight to resist the dilution of dividend-tax relief? 
One explanation for the absence of business protest was that the economy 
had begun to strengthen while the bill was still pending. By the time the bill 
reached the Senate in late June 1954, the chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors announced in a cabinet meeting that “recovery was underway.”186 
Total corporate cash flow, which had remained stagnant in 1953 and 1954, and 
retained profits, which had dipped in 1954, both rose significantly by 1955.187 The 
stock market also recovered, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average rising 
above its 1929 high in November of 1954 for the first time since the stock 
market crash, and the number of stockholders jumping from 6 million in 1952 to 
8.6 million by 1956.188 
This change in underlying economic circumstances may have reduced 
corporate managers’ concern about equity investment. Indeed, managers 
generally had cause to prefer to use retained earnings because they avoided the 
scrutiny applied by creditors and stockholders. When profits were down and 
credit was too expensive, though, the only alternative was to seek external 
financing through equity investors. Double taxation interfered not only because 
it made stock less attractive to investors during an economic cycle when stock 
appreciation was less likely, but because it put pressure on managers to pay 
higher dividends to provide an attractive after-tax return to investors, thus 
potentially further reducing the available retained earnings. Once corporate 
profits resumed normal levels, though, the accelerated-depreciation provision 
and other entity-level corporate tax reforms—such as more liberal loss-
carryforward provisions, current deductions for research-and-development 
expenses, and an easier standard for retaining earnings—were more valuable to 
managers, because those managers could use a greater proportion of the profits 
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for internal financing.189 Even for firms that preferred external financing, the 
economic recovery made double taxation less concerning. For example, the 
Wall Street Journal reported that a number of utility corporations told members 
of Congress that the Senate proposal to limit dividend tax relief to a fifty-dollar 
exclusion “would help bring out sufficient equity capital for the time being, 
even without any tax credit.”190 Thus, though a coalition of business interests 
appeared to form behind Eisenhower’s dividend tax relief proposal in 1953, it is 
not surprising that consensus did not remain strong enough to push through 
more-significant dividend-tax relief when the crisis eased. 
This is not to suggest that the push for integration disappeared completely. 
Most notably, in 1958 Congress enacted an elective pass-through scheme—
Subchapter S—although it was limited to small business corporations whose 
concern about double taxation was never particularly great.191 Several 
integration proposals garnered significant support during the 1980s and 1990s,192 
but none was adopted. At the end of the century, the corporate income tax 
looked remarkably similar to the one criticized at the end of World War II. It 
would not be until 2003 that an integration proposal would again garner 
sufficient support to pass. Rather than adopting full dividend exclusion, though, 
as originally proposed by President Bush, Congress adopted a compromise 
measure that taxed certain dividends at the lower capital-gains rate.193 As in 
1954, therefore, it fell far short of major reform. 
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